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INTRODUCTION
At 2:47 A.M., Nancy's breathing stopped. Joe reached his hand to
Nancy's face and pulled her eyelids closed. Uncle George looked
back into the room and saw the end had come. He walked down to
the nursing station and said, "Ithink it's over."

Although the final moments of Nancy Cruzan's life were calm, the
prior seven years represented a difficult struggle for her husband,
parents, and close friends.
An unfortunate car accident left Nancy Cruzan in a persistent
vegetative state. 2 Nancy's parents requested that her feeding tube be
removed after it became apparent that her condition would not improve;
however, the hospital refused to comply with their request without first
receiving court authorization. 3 Ultimately, Nancy Cruzan's feeding tube
was removed but not before the United States Supreme Court issued a
landmark decision regarding the authority of surrogate decision makers
in matters involving life-sustaining treatment.
Now, assume that the parents of the incapacitated individual, acting
as co-guardians, want to refuse medical treatment; yet, instead of being
able to reference the statements made by the ward5 prior to his or her
incompetency to support their decision, no such statements exist because
the ward has been incompetent since birth.6 Such facts recently
confronted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in In re D.L.H.7
1. WILLIAM H. COLBY, LONG GOODBYE: THE DEATHS OF NANCY CRUZAN 389 (Jill
Kramer ed. 2002).
2. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990). A persistent
vegetative state is distinguishable from a permanent vegetative state. See The MultiSociety Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of'the Persistent Vegetative State, 330 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1501 (1994) (stating that "'persistent' refers only to a condition of
past and continuing disability with an uncertain future, whereas 'permanent' implies
irreversibility. Persistent vegetative state is a diagnosis; permanent vegetative state is a
prognosis.").
3. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 267-68.
4. See generally John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of
Nontreatment Decisionsfor Incompetent Patients,25 GA. L. REv. 1139 (1991) (analyzing
the Court's decision and constitutional limits to treatment decisions).
5. "Ward" is defined as the person "who is under a guardian's charge or
protection." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1720 (9th ed. 2009). Pennsylvania's statutory
chapter on the appointment of guardians uses the term "incapacitated person" in lieu of
ward. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5501-5555 (2006). Consequently, this Comment will
use the term "incapacitated person" rather than "ward."
6. In Cruzan, petitioners adduced evidence that Nancy would not want to be kept
alive because of previous statements that she made. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d
408, 411 (Mo. 1988) ("The trial court found that Nancy expressed, in 'somewhat serious
conversation' that if sick or injured she would not want to continue her life unless she
could live 'halfway normally.' Based on this conversation, the trial court concluded that
'she would not wish to continue with nutrition and hydration."').
7. In re D.L.H., 2 A.3d 505 (Pa. 2010).
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David L. Hockenberry (David) suffered from profound mental
retardation since birth and had limited capacities of expression.' He
resided in the Ebensburg Center, one of six centers operated by
Pennsylvania's Office of Mental Retardation, for over forty-five years.9
In 2002, the Orphans' Court appointed his parents, Myrl and Vada
Hockenberry, as joint plenary guardians of the person and plenary
guardians of the estateo for David."
On December 21, 2007, David swallowed a hairpin and grew ill
with aspiration pneumonia.12 The Ebensburg Center transferred David to
Memorial Hospital in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, for treatment, and the
hospital placed David on a mechanical ventilator.' 3 David's parents
attempted to refuse the ventilator treatment, but the hospital asserted that
the parents, as plenary guardians of the person, did not have authority to
refuse such treatment.14
David's parents filed a petition with the Orphans' Court to be
appointed as David's health care agents.' 5 The Orphans' Court denied
David's parents" 6 petition. 7 The Superior Court affirmed the Orphans'

8. See Joint Brief for Appellees David L. Hockenberry and Ebensburg Center at 3,
In re D.L.H., 2 A.3d 505 (Pa. 2010) (No. 98 MAP 2009) (on file with author) (stating
that, if given the opportunity at trial, they would have produced evidence showing David
"is ambulatory, can partially dress himself, selects his food at the Ebensburg Center
cafeteria (his favorite dessert is rice pudding), can feed himself, expresses preferences for
the company of some over others, and goes off the Ebensburg Center campus several
times a month to visit shopping malls, eat at restaurants such as Wendy's and Dairy
Queen, and go to the movies").
9. See id at 2; Pennsylvania Auditor General, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare Ebensburg Center July 1, 2003 to July 7, 2006
Performance Audit, I (April 11, 2007), http://www.auditorgen.state.pa.us/archives/
Performance/SO/stoEbensburgCenter041107.pdf
10. For a discussion on the types of guardianship in Pennsylvania, see infra Part
II.A.
i1. See In re D.L.H., Orphans' Ct. No. 21-02-293, slip op. at 1 (Cumberland Cnty.
Ct. Jan. 24, 2008), available at http://records.ccpa.net/weblinkjudges/DocView.
aspx?id=170410&dbid=3.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See In re D.L.H., 2 A.3d 505, 507 (Pa. 2010).
15. See id.
16. In 2008, a third co-guardian, Bonnie Prevost, was also appointed by the Court.
See In re D.L.H., Orphans' Ct. No. 21-02-293 (Cumberland Cnty. Ct. Feb. 4, 2008). The
parents petitioned for appointment of Ms. Prevost because she regularly visited David,
assisted David's parents in caring for David, and David's parents desired "minimum
disruption [of David's guardianship] in the event of their death, incapacity or infirmity."
See Petition for Appointment of Additional Plenary Guardian of the Estate and Person in
Accordance with 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5511 at 2, In re D.L.H., Orphans' Ct. No. 21-02293 (Cumberland Cnty. Ct. Feb. 2, 2008). Ms. Prevost, however, did not join the
parents' petition to be appointed as David's health care agent.
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Court's decision, and the parents appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.'8 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the decision using a
plain language interpretation of the state's Health Care Agents and
Representatives Act (the Act)."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that the Act allows a
health care agent to be appointed only by a competent principal. 2 0
Because David never possessed the capacities to appoint a health care
agent, the Court was unable to fashion a remedy. 21 According to the
Court, the Act controlled the Court's holding; the hospital had an
affirmative duty to provide treatment.2 2 Therefore, the guardians had no
authority to refuse treatment on David's behalf.23
In this sad story, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court failed to answer
the tough questions. Namely, because David has been incompetent his
entire life, how would he ever be capable of executing an advance health
care directive? If David's guardians are unable to make decisions
regarding life-preserving medical treatment, who can make those
decisions for someone like David? How far do the powers of plenary
guardians of the person extend? Is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision reconcilable with its previous jurisprudence, in particular In re
Fiori?24 Lastly, did the Pennsylvania Supreme Court effectuate the
legislature's intent in passing the Health Care Agents and
Representatives Act? This Comment will seek to address each of these
questions in turn.
Part II of this Comment will provide a framework of the material
This section will discuss
concepts involved in David's case.
guardianship law in Pennsylvania, the Act, and the reasoning applied by
the Orphans' Court, the Superior Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.
Part III of this Comment will analyze the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's holding and identify implications of the In re D.L.H. decision.
Specifically, this Comment will contend that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court did not incorporate the legislature's intent when the Court
interpreted the statute. In the alternative, assuming the Pennsylvania
17. See In re D.L.H., Orphans' Ct. No. 21-02-293, slip op. at 8 (Cumberland Cnty.
Ct. Jan. 24, 2008), available at http://records.ccpa.net/weblinkjudges/DocView.
aspx?id=170410&dbid=3.
18. See In re D.L.H., 967 A.2d 971 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009); D.L.H., 2 A.3d 505.
19. See Health Care Agents and Representatives Act, 2006 Pa. Laws 1484 (codified
at 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5421-5488 (2006)); D.L.H., 2 A.3d at 514-15.
20. See D.L.H, 2 A.3d at 514.
21. See id at 514-15.
22. See id. at 515.
23. See id.
24. In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996).
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Supreme Court reached the decision intended by the General Assembly,
this Comment will discuss implications of the Court's decision.
Additionally, this Comment will propose how to avoid existing
confusion regarding the rights of life-long, incapacitated individuals and
the role of guardians in decisions involving life-preserving and lifesustaining treatment.
In Part IV, this Comment will conclude by advocating for the
recommended changes and urging the General Assembly to produce
clearer guidelines for surrogate health care decision making.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

PennsylvaniaGuardianshipLaw

The guardianship system seeks to enhance the lives of incapacitated
individuals by appointing another individual-a guardian-to assist with
essential functions that the incapacitated individual is unable to properly
perform.2 5 As a result, a guardian is merely the "fiduciary who has the
care and management of the estate or person of a minor or an
incapacitated person." 2 6
Upon a petition to the court, a guardian is appointed after clear and
convincing evidence demonstrates that an individual is incompetent and
requires assistance with an aspect related to their welfare. 2 7 In making a
decision, the court must consider the nature of any condition that impairs
the individual's capacity, the individual's ability to make and
communicate decisions, and the availability of friends and family to
Based on such
provide support in lieu of guardianship services."
assessments, the court will determine the type of guardianship requiredlimited or plenary and of the person or of the estate-as well as the
duration of the guardianship. 2 9 Because the guardian is appointed, the
guardian operates as a bailiff of the court who protects the incapacitated
30
person.
The first significant guardianship distinction is between guardians
of the person and guardians of the estate. Guardians of the person are
responsible for the incapacitated person's care and custody.3' A guardian
25. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5502 (2006).
26. Id. § 102 (2006).
27. See id. § 5511 (2006); see also In re Peery, 727 A.2d 539, 541 (Pa. 1999)
(stating that, regardless of incapacity, the critical inquiry is "whether or not the alleged
incapacitated person needs a guardian").
28. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5512.1(a) (2006).
29. See id.
30. See Harvey Appeal, 85 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952).
31. See In re Stapas, 820 A.2d 850, 857 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
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of the person must assert the best interests of the incapacitated person.
In doing so, the guardian must respect the preferences of the
incapacitated person and encourage the incapacitated person to
participate in decisions to the greatest extent possible.3 3 Moreover, a
guardian of the person must receive court approval before consenting on
behalf of the incapacitated person to marriage or divorce, experimental
medical procedures, sterilization, abortion, or removal of a healthy
bodily organ.34
In contrast to a guardian of the person, a guardian of the estate
manages the incapacitated person's assets and property.3 5 A guardian of
the estate may expend the incapacitated person's assets on care and
maintenance for the incapacitated person without receiving court
approval. 36 However, the guardian must file an annual report with the
court detailing the incapacitated person's income, investments,
expenditures, and needs.37
The second guardianship distinction rests in plenary versus limited
guardianship. The statutory presumption is for a limited guardianship.38
A limited guardianship is entered for those incapacitated persons who are
"partially incapacitated" and require the services of a guardian.39 Plenary
guardianship, on the other hand, requires more; both plenary guardians of
the person and plenary guardians of the estate are appointed by the court
"only upon a finding that the [incapacitated person] is totally
incapacitated and in need of plenary guardianship services."4o
B.

The Health CareAgents And RepresentativesAct

In 2006, the Pennsylvania General Assembly unanimously passed
the Health Care Agents and Representatives Act.41 Governor Edward
Rendell signed the legislation into law on November 29, 2006.42 Upon
32. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5521(a) (2006).
33. See id
34. See id. § 552 1(d) (2006).
35. See In re Stapas, 820 A.2d at 857.
36. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5536(a) (2006).
37. See id § 5521(c)(1) (2006).
38. See id § 5512.1(a)(6) (2006) (stating "[t]he court shall prefer limited
guardianship").
39. Id. § 5512.1(b) (2006); id. § 5512.1(d) (2006).
40. Id. § 5512.1(c) (2006) (emphasis added); id. § 5512.1(e) (2006) (emphasis
added).
41. See General Assembly, Bill Information: Regular Session 2005-2006, Senate Bill
628, http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/bill history.cfm?syear-2005&sind=0&
body=S&type=B&bn=628 (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
42. See id.; Governor Edward G. Rendell, Governor Rendell Signs Bills (Nov. 29,
http://www.governor.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt?open=18&objID=668934&
2006),
mode=2.
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passage by the General Assembly, Senator Stewart Greenleaf, the bill's
sponsor in the Senate, indicated that the Act would assist physicians and

their patients in making difficult end-of-life decisions.43
Greenleaf described the framework of the Act as follows:

Senator

Senate Bill 628 amends the Probate Code to further provide a
statutory means for competent adults to control their health care
either directly through instructions written in advance (living wills)
or indirectly through a health care agent (health care powers of
attorney) or, when there is no advance directive, through a health care
representative (usually a member of the patient's family). 44
As the name suggests, the Act permits health care agents and
representatives to make surrogate health care decisions.4 5 Health care
agents, however, retain more authority to make health care decisions than
health care representatives.46 The Act defines a health care agent as
"[a]n individual designated by a principal in an advance health care
directive." 4 7 An advance health care directive includes a health care
power of attorney, 48 living will, 4 9 or a combination thereof.50 An
individual who executes an advance health care directive must be of
sound mind and either 18 years of age or older, a high school graduate,
married, or an emancipated minor.5 '

A health care agent has the authority to make all decisions regarding
health care treatment that the principal himself or herself could have
made prior to incapacity. 5 2 However, the health care agent's authority is
not absolute; the agent remains accountable to the principal and, if
appointed, the principal's guardian of the person.53 Furthermore, the

43. See State Senator Stewart J. Greenleaf, GreenleafHealth Care Decision Making
Bill Passes House (Nov. 21, 2006), http://www.senatorgreenleaf.com/press/2006/
112106.htm.

44. Id
45. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5451 (2006) (stating that the "subchapter shall be
known and may be cited as the Health Care Agents and Representatives Act").
46. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 546 1(c) (2006); see also infra pp. 14-15.
47. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5422 (2006).
48. A health care power of attorney is the "writing made by a principal designating
an individual to make health care decisions for the principal." Id.
49. A living will is the "writing . . . that expresses a principal's wishes and
instructions for health care and health care directions when the principal is determined to
be incompetent and has an end-stage medical condition or is permanently unconscious."
Id.
50. See id.
51. See id. § 5442(a) (2006); id § 5452(a) (2006).
52. See id 5456(a) (2006).
53. See id.; id § 5460(a) (2006).
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health care agent's appointment can be revoked or amended by either the
principal or the guardian.54
In contrast, a health care representative may be appointed only to
make health care decisions under limited circumstances.ss An individual
is able to designate a health care representative either in writing or by
personally informing the physician or provider. 56 If there is no prior
designation, the following individuals, in descending order of priority,
can serve as a health care representative upon a determination by the
physician that the individual is incompetent: spouse, adult child, parent,
adult brother or sister, adult grandchild, or any adult with knowledge of
the principal's wishes.57 However, if a guardian of the person is already
appointed for the principal, a health care representative may not be
designated.
When life-preserving treatment is necessary and the individual to
receive treatment is neither in an end-stage medical condition nor
permanently unconscious, a health care agent retains refusal authority. 59
Conversely, a health care representative will never have the authority to
make a life-preserving treatment decision for a principal who is neither
permanently unconscious nor diagnosed with an end-stage medical
condition. 60 Absent this distinction and the limited circumstances under
which a health care representative may be appointed, the scope of
authority for a health care representative and a health care agent is
similar.6 1
C.

In re D.L.H.: IdenticalDispositions,But Different Reasoning
1.

Cumberland County Orphans' Court

After David's parents filed their petition for appointment as David's
health care agents, the hospital discontinued use of the mechanical
ventilator because David's health improved. 62 Thus, by the time the
Cumberland County Orphans' Court heard the case, David's parents'
54. See id. § 5460(a); id § 5454(d) (2006).
55. See id § 5461 (2006).
56. See id. § 5461(d) (2006).
57. See id.; id. § 5461(a) (2006) (stating that "[a] health care representative may
make a health care decision for an individual whose attending physician has determined
that the individual is incompetent").
58. See id. § 5461(a)(3) (2006).
59. See id. § 5462(c)(1) (2006).
60. See id.; id § 5461(c) (2006).
61. See id § 5461(c).
62. See In re D.L.H., Orphans' Ct. No. 21-02-293, slip op. at 2 (Cumberland Cnty.
Ct. Jan. 24, 2008), available at http://records.ccpa.net/weblinkjudges/Doc View.aspx?
id=170410&dbid=3.
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request to be appointed health care agents was technically moot because

use of the mechanical ventilator was no longer at issue. 63 The Orphans'
Court concluded that, even though the underlying factual circumstances
changed, the legal question remained because the parents still sought to
64
become David's health care agents.
On the merits, the Orphans' Court determined that the parents'
petition failed because the court had no authority to appoint health care
agents under the Act.65 By definition under the Act, health care agents
may be appointed only by the principal pursuant to an advance health
care directive.66 David was never at any point in his life competent to
execute such a directive; as a result, the Act stripped the court of any
authority to appoint health care agents.67 The court held that the Act
allowed refusal of life-preserving treatment only if the competent
individual or an appointed health care agent objects to the treatment,
absent the principal being permanently unconscious or in an end-stage
medical condition. 68 Thus, the Orphans' Court denied the parents'
petition.69
2.

Superior Court

David's parents appealed the decision, and the Superior Court
affirmed the trial court's disposition but provided a more expansive
holding.70 Before addressing the issue on the merits, the court concluded
that although the issue was technically moot, the questions presented
were of public importance and capable of repetition and evading
*71
review.
In reaching its legal conclusion, the Superior Court referenced the
differences between the powers of a guardian and those of an agent at

common law. 7 2 The court recognized a fundamental distinction between
the two entities and found that "the authority granted to a health care
agent in [Section] 5456 is much more consistent with the creation of an
agency relationship and the duty of the agent 'to comply with all lawful

63. See id
64. See id
65. See id at 7-8.
66. See id.; 20 PA. CONs. STAT. § 5422 (2006).
67. See In re D.L.H., Orphans' Ct. No. 21-02-293, slip op. at 8 (Cumberland Cnty.
Ct. Jan. 24, 2008), available at http://records.ccpa.net/weblinkjudges/DocView.aspx?
id=170410&dbid=3.
68. See id. at 5.
69. See id at 8.
70. See In re D.L.H., 967 A.2d 971 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
71. See id. at 976.
72. See id at 980.
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instructions received from the principal."' 73 The common law distinction
between guardians and agents, coupled with the court's interpretation of
the Act, led the court to conclude that the parents' position as plenary
guardians of David did not vest them with the unfettered authority to
make decisions regarding life-preserving treatment. 7 4
Still, the Superior Court considered whether a plenary guardian of
the person could ever be awarded such decision-making authority by an
Orphans' Court." For the purpose of considering that question, the court
assumed-without actually deciding-that an Orphans' Court could
grant a guardian's request to refuse medical treatment under its inherent
authority as parens patriae.76 The court noted that procedurally a
guardian would be required to petition the court before refusing medical
Then, the guardian must prove by clear and convincing
treatment.
evidence that refusal of medical treatment would be in the best interest of
the incompetent individual.
The Superior Court recognized the "extraordinary burden" for a
petitioner attempting to prove, "by clear and convincing evidence, that
death is in the best interest of a life-long incompetent." 7 9 In addition to
the high evidentiary burden, the court mandated that a petitioner present
testimony from a reliable medical expert that demonstrates the
"incompetent's severe, permanent medical condition (or severe,
permanent medical condition with progressive features) and current state
of physical/psychological deterioration and pain., 80
To grant a petitioner's request to refuse life-preserving treatment,
the Superior Court held that the medical evidence must demonstrate that
the benefits of prolonged treatment would be inhumane and contrary to
basic notions of decency.81 Therefore, the Orphans' Court should never
consider the convenience for or interests of parents, guardians, or society
in general; rather, the court should consider only the best interests of the

Id (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 809(2) (2006)).
74. See id at 982.
75. See id
76. See id.; see also In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1381 (Pa. 1982) ("[t]he
parens patriae power of our courts derives from the inherent equitable authority of the
sovereign to protect those persons within the state who cannot protect themselves because
of a legal disability. . . . Consistent therewith, it is acknowledged that a court's authority
is at its widest reach when acting as an equity court to protect the person or property of an
incompetent . . . and has been described as 'plenary and potent to afford whatever relief
may be necessary to protect his interests"') (citations omitted).
77. See D.L.H, 967 A.2d at 982.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 983.
80. Id. at 984 (citing Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 689 (Ariz. 1987)).
81. See id
73.
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incompetent. 82 In addition, the Orphans' Court should give no weight to
any mental disabilities from which the incapacitated person may suffer. 3
Turning to the matter sub judice, the Superior Court found no
medical testimony in the record to satisfy the best interest standard.84
Thus, even assuming the Orphans' Court could grant the parents' request
to refuse medical treatment, the parents failed to prove it was in David's
best interest. Ultimately, the Superior Court held that:
[W]here a life-long incompetent adult has neither an end-stage
medical illness nor is in a [permanent vegetative state], and a plenary
guardian seeks to decline life-preserving medical treatment on behalf
of the incompetent, if the plenary guardian fails to establish that death
is in the incompetent's best interests, by clear and convincing proof,
then the guardian does not have the legal authority to decline life
preserving treatment on behalf of the incompetent.86
3.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Not persuaded by the Superior Court's reasoning, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court began its statutory interpretation by recognizing that
Section 5462(c)(1) of the Act expressly limits the individuals who can
refuse life-preserving treatment. 87 The Court acknowledged that the Act
reflects the "[1]egislature's assertion of a policy position of greater state
involvement to preserve life in such circumstances."88 Given that the
legislature acted within its prerogative as policymakers, the Court offered
no criticism of the Act. 89 Instead, the Court held that it was simply
bound to enforce the policy of the legislature. 90
Much like the Orphans' Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
opted for a plain language interpretation of the Act and found that the
Act left the Court with no power to appoint a health care agent.9 The
Court further held that "where, as here, life-preserving treatment is at
issue for an incompetent person who is not suffering from an end-stage

82.

See id. at 983-84.

83. See id. at 984.
84. See id. at 985.
85. See id
86. Id.at 987.
87. See In re D.L.H., 2 A.3d 505, 513-14 (Pa. 2010).
88. Id at 514.
89. See id at 515 (stating "[w]e find only that the salient policy decision has been
made by the Legislature, in Section 5462(c)(1) of the Act as is its prerogative as the
policy-setting branch").
90. See id
91. See idat 514-15.
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condition or permanent unconsciousness, and that person has no health
care agent, the Act mandates that the care must be provided."92
III. ANALYSIS
A.

The PennsylvaniaSupreme Court's InterpretationRendered the
Legislative Intent Section of the Health Care Agents and
Representatives Act Meaningless
1.

Pennsylvania's Statutory Construction Act

In considering David's case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
invoked a plain language interpretation of the Health Care Agents and
Representatives Act.9 3 Based on the text of Section 5462(c), the Court
held that a hospital has an affirmative duty to provide life-preserving
treatment unless one of four conditions exist: (1) the principal is in an
end-stage medical condition; (2) the principal is permanently
unconscious; (3) the principal is competent and objects; or, (4) the
principal has previously appointed a health care agent who objects and is
authorized to do so by a power of attorney or living will. 94 The Court,
however, applied Section 5462(c) in a vacuum: by using a plain language
reading of Section 5462(c) alone, the Court created a result that was
manifestly inconsistent with the legislature's intent. 9 5
Pennsylvania's Statutory Construction Act is a legislative chapter
dealing with interpretation of statutes.96 The Statutory Construction Act
provides that each statute is to be construed in such a manner as "to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly" and
"give effect to all [the statute's] provisions."97 The rules of interpretation
are to be observed "unless the application of such rules would result in a
construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General
Assembly." 98 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has previously looked to
the Statutory Construction Act for guidance in construing statutes and
acknowledged that the Act controls the Court's jurisprudence. 99
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 515.
See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5462(c) (2006).
See id. § 5462(c); D.L.H., 2 A.3d at 514-15.
See infra Part III.A.2.
See 1 PA. CONs. STAT. §§ 1901-1991 (2006).
Id. § 1921(a).
Id. § 1901.
See Commonwealth v. Hoke, 962 A.2d 664, 667 (Pa. 2009) (citing 1 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 1921(a) (2006)) ("[o]ur task in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and effectuate
the intention of the General Assembly"); see also Aaron D. Martin, Comment, Liberty
Finds No Refuge in a Jurisprudence of Doubt: The UnconstitutionalUse of Legislative
History in Construing Pennsylvania Statutes, 99 DICK. L. REv. 1043, 1048 (1995)
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In David's case, the Court recognized that the primary indicator of
legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. 0 0 The Court stated
that the plain language of the Health Care Agents and Representatives
Act limits the category of persons who are able to make decisions
involving life-preserving treatment.' 0 While some sections of the Act
discuss guardians and health care representatives, the Court noted that
Section 5462(c) does not authorize either surrogate to make a decision
regarding life-preserving treatment.' 0 2 The Court then cited the Statutory
Construction Act: "Exceptions expressed in a statute shall be construed
to exclude all others."' 0 3 As a result, the Court stated that "the plainthe [Health Care Agents and
meaning interpretation of ...
Representatives] Act simply does not allow for the refusal of lifepreserving care to one who has never had the ability to appoint a health
care agent and does not suffer from an end-stage condition or permanent

unconsciousness."

04

While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court referenced the Statutory
Construction Act, the Court failed to acknowledge its most material
As referenced earlier, the Statutory Construction Act
provisions.
provides an escape valve from a plain language interpretation of a
clearly-worded statute when the result is inconsistent with the expressed
intent of the legislature; the Statutory Construction Act pursues a careful
balance in this regard. 0 5 As the later provisions make clear, statutory
words free from ambiguity should not be "disregarded under the pretext
of pursuing its spirit."

06

Thus, the Statutory Construction Act provides

that a court should abandon a plain language reading only when the result
is unmistakably contrary to the expressed intent of the legislature. 0 7
2.

Application of the Statutory Construction Act to the Health
Care Agents and Representatives Act

Section 5462(c) limits both the conditions when life-preserving
treatment can be refused and the individuals who have the authority to

(stating that "[t]he [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that it looks to
the [Statutory Construction] Act for guidance and has even expressed its subservience to
it") (footnotes omitted).
100. See In re D.L.H., 2 A.3d 505, 513 (Pa. 2010).
101. Seeid. at 513-14.
102. See id at 514.
103. Id (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1924 (2006)); see also supra pp. 21-22
(discussing the four exceptions in Section 5462(c) that were identified by the Court).
104. D.L.H., 2 A.3d at 515.
105. See I PA. CONS. STAT. § 1901 (2006).
106. Id.§ 1921(b) (2006).
107. See id § 1901; id. § 1921(b).
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make such refusals. 08 When applied to an individual like David,
however, a plain language interpretation of the Health Care Agents and
Representatives Act produces a result that is inconsistent with the
manifest intent of the General Assembly. The Act contains a section on
legislative findings and intent, which states:
This chapter provides a statutory means for competent adults to

control their health care through instructions written in advance or by
health care agents or health care representatives and requested orders.
Nothing in this chapter is intended to:
(1) affect or supersede the holdings of In re Fiori 543 Pa. 592,
673 A.2d 905 (1996);
(2) condone, authorize or approve mercy killing, euthanasia or
aided suicide; or
(3) permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end
life other than as defined in this chapter.109
On its face, the legislative intent section indicates that the Act was
never meant to apply to someone like David. Specifically, the phrase
"competent adults" modifies application of the Health Care Agents and
Representatives Act to only competent individuals.o David's case was
notable because it involved an individual who has been incompetent his
entire life."' The Court acknowledged this complication but argued that
Section 5462(c) listed only four possible exceptions for the hospital's
affirmative duty to provide treatment, none of which pertained to a lifelong incompetent.112 The Court stated that the legislative intent section
failed to modify application of the Health Care Agents and
Representatives Act because Section 5461 of the Act prioritizes
individuals who may make health care decisions on behalf of an
incompetent individual without an advance health care directive."
Therefore, the Court concluded the Act applies to incompetent and
competent individuals alike. 14
However, the discussion of health care representatives in Section
5461 corresponds with an application of the Act for only competent
108. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5462(c) (2006).
109. Id § 5423(a) (emphasis added).
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
112. See In re D.L.H., 2 A.3d 505, 515 (Pa. 2010).
113. See id. at 515 (stating that "[w]hile the Act clearly reflects the express policy of
empowering competent adults to effectuate advance health care directives, the provision
for health care representation even in the absence of such directives . . . clearly conveys
that the statute advances other purposes as well") (citations omitted).
114. See id
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adults. The Health Care Agents and Representatives Act repealed the
Advance Directive for Health Care Act.'s The Advance Directive for
Health Care Act failed to address treatment decisions for individuals who
left no advance directives." 6 Section 5461 of the Health Care Agents
and Representatives Act addresses that previous omission; Section 5461
serves as the default health care directive for those individuals who are of
sound mind and reach maturity, but fail to execute an advance health
care directive."' 7 All of the requisite conditions for selection of a health
care representative demand a previously competent adult." 8 Section
5461 appoints a de facto surrogate decision maker-a health care
representative-for these individuals in a descending order of priority. 1 9
Thus, the Court's reading of the Act runs contrary to the Statutory
Construction Act for two primary reasons.
First, the Court's consideration of Section 5462(c) alone failed to
give effect to all the provisions of the Health Care Agents and
Representatives Act. The Court's interpretation ignored the legislative
intent in Section 5423, which provided the competency exception
Without invoking the
encompassing David's circumstances. 120
legislative intent section, the logic employed by the Court amounts to an
infinite loop which can never be satisfied by an individual like David:
competency is required to execute an advance health care directive; 12 an
advance health care directive is required to refuse life-preserving
treatment when not in an end-stage medical condition or permanently
unconscious;122 David has been incompetent since birth;12 3 therefore,
115. See Health Care Agents and Representatives Act, 2006 Pa. Laws 1484 (codified
at 20 PA. CONs. STAT. §§ 5421-5488 (2006)); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5401-5416 (repealed
2006).

116. See In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 911 (Pa. 1996) (stating that "the [Advance
Directive for Health Care] Act does not address the situation where no advance directives
were left as to treatment"); see also 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5407(b) (repealed 2006)
(stating that "the absence of a declaration by a patient shall not give rise to any
presumption as to the intent of the patient to consent to or to refuse the initiation,
continuation, or termination of life-sustaining treatment").
17. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5461 (2006); see also id § 5442(a); id § 5452(a).
118. The physician must determine the individual is incompetent. See id. § 5461(a).
In addition, the individual must be over 18 years of age, not have a health care power of
attorney or a health care agent who is reasonably available, and not have a guardian
appointed. See id. Because guardians are appointed for incapacitated individuals, the
requirement that no guardian be appointed ensures that the individual previously
possessed capacity. See supra Part II.A. Thus, a health care representative is available
only to an individual who could have properly designated their health care wishes in
advance of incompetency but failed to do so.
119. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 546 1(d) (2006).
120. See id. § 5423(a).
121. See id. § 5442(a)); id § 5452(a).
122. See id. § 5462(c); id. § 5422.
123. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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David cannot execute a health care directive or refuse life-preserving
treatment.
Arguably, the legislature did not expect such an illogical result
given the section on legislative intent that was included in the Act. 12 4 A
reading of Section 5462 without reference to the legislative intent section
harshly places David within the constraints of the Act even though he
could never execute an advance health care directive. 125 The legislative
intent section suggests that the Act was meant to apply only to
individuals of sound mind who reached the age of maturity and executed
or failed to execute an advance health care directive.' 26 Thus, a reading
of Section 5462(c) that incorporates the General Assembly's expressed
intent produces a result that is consistent with the intent of the
legislature. 27 In addition, such an interpretation gives effect to all the
material provisions of the Act.12 8
Second, the Court's determination that the Act was never intended
to allow a surrogate to make decisions regarding life-preserving
treatment for a life-long incompetent violates the Statutory Construction
Act because it demands an interpretation that is absurd, impossible of
The Health Care Agents and
execution, and unreasonable. 12 9
Representatives Act expressly states that "[i]ndividuals have a qualified
right to make decisions relating to their own health care."l 3 0 Such a right
is not uniquely bestowed to competent individuals, but to incompetent
ones as well.131 Therefore, David retains a right to make decisions, even
if he himself cannot articulate them.
If the Court's interpretation of the Act is correct, no one could ever
refuse life-preserving treatment on David's behalf: David could never
have a health care representative;132 David could never execute an

124. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5423(a) (2006).
125. See In re D.L.H., 2 A.3d 505, 515 (Pa. 2010).
126. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5423(a).
127. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1901 (2006).
128. See id. § 1921(a).
129. The Statutory Construction Act states "[t]hat the General Assembly does not
intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable." Id. § 1922(1).
130. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5423(c)(1) (2006).
131. See Michael P. Allen, The Constitution at the Threshold of Life and Death: A
Suggested Approach to Accommodate an Interest in Life and a Right to Die, 53 AM. U. L.
REv. 971, 982-83 (2004) (stating that "[t]he [Cruzan] Court further assumes that the right
to refuse medical treatment is not restricted to competent adults . . . [and] accepts, for
purposes of the decision, that an incompetent person retains the assumed constitutional
right to refuse medical treatment").
132. While a health care representative may not refuse life-preserving treatment under
the Act, a health care representative may not be appointed when there is a guardian
already appointed. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5461 (a)(3) (2006).
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advance health care directive;' 33 the guardian of the person could never
make a decision regarding life-preserving treatment;134 and, because
David himself lacked competency, 1 he could not object to the treatment
on his own behalf.136 By refusing David's parents' petition and holding
the Act applies, the Court effectively dismissed David's right to make a
decision about his care.1 37 As a result, the Court's decision creates a
result that is not only absurd but also unreasonable and impossible to
execute. 38
3.

Summary

In reaching its conclusion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated
that it was "unable to disregard the limitations inherent in Section

5462(c)(1)'s clearly-worded exception to the general requirement for
treatment for life-threatening but curable medical conditions."' 39 As
previously discussed, clear wording of a statute alone fails to carry the
day when interpretation of the statute is contrary to the expressed intent
of the legislature.14 0 Given the stated intent of the General Assembly in
the Act and the inherent authority provided to guardians, a more
reasonable interpretation existed for the Court: the Court could have held
that Section 5462(c) did not apply to David because he was a life-long
incompetent. 1 Moreover, the Court could have utilized the legislative
intent section and denied the guardian's request to refuse life-preserving
133. See id. § 5442(a) (2006) (executing a living will requires an "individual of sound
mind"); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5452(a) (2006) (executing a health care power of attorney
requires an "individual of sound mind").
134. See In re D.L.H., 2 A.3d 505, 514 (Pa. 2010) (stating that "[a]lthough the Act
provides certain powers to guardians and health care representatives, see, e.g., id.
§§ 5460(b), 5461(c), it does not explicitly authorize either surrogate to object to lifepreserving care under Section 5462(c)(1) in the noted circumstances").
135. Competent is defined as a:
condition in which an individual, when provided appropriate medical
information, communication supports and technical assistance, is documented
by a health care provider to do all of the following:
(1) Understand the potential material benefits, risks and alternatives
involved in a specific proposed health care decision.
(2) Make that health care decision on his own behalf.
(3) Communicate that health care decision to any other person.
This term is intended to permit individuals to be found competent to make
some health care decisions, but incompetent to make others.
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5422 (2006).
136. See id. § 5462(c) (specifying exception "if the individual is competent and
objects to such care").
137. See id. § 5423(c)(1); D.L.H., 2 A.3d at 515.
138. See 1 PA. CONs. STAT. § 1922(1) (2006).
139. D.L.H., 2 A.3d at 514.
140. See supra Part III.A.1.
141. See supra Part III.A.2.
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treatment on other grounds. For instance, the court could have
characterized David's guardians' request as euthanasia or a mercy killboth of which are prohibited under the Act. 14 2 Such an interpretation
would provide the same result in a manner less destructive to the
Statutory Construction Act.
Guardians Can Influence Life-Preserving Treatment Decisions

B.

A corollary to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding regarding
an affirmative duty of treatment is that guardians of the person lack
standing under the Health Care Agents and Representatives Act to make
decisions related to life-preserving treatment. 143 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court was not persuaded by arguments that the legislature
expected the guardian to have a role involving life-preserving
treatment. 144 First, the Court noted that guardians were not authorized
surrogate decision makers under Section 5462(c).145 Second, even
though certain provisions in the guardianship statute provide a list of
items the guardian cannot consent to, that list is not exhaustive. 14 6 The
guardianship statute states that the court cannot grant to guardians the
authority controlled by other statutes. 14 7 Third, although the Act allows
guardians to amend or revoke the appointment of a health care agent, the
Act does not allow guardians the authority to appoint a health care
agent.14 8 Thus, the guardian only has an oversight role that provides an
extra layer of protection for incompetent persons. 14 9
The Court reasoned that the Health Care Agents and
Representatives Act prohibited a court from granting a guardian the
power to make decisions concerning life-preserving treatment.150 Yet,
this is not the only possible interpretation, and the two statutory
If the Health Care Agents and
provisions can be reconciled.
Representatives Act's legislative intent section is given meaning, the
Act-and its ensuing discussion on parties authorized to refuse lifepreserving treatment-applies to only competent adults.' 5 ' Therefore,
the Act does not invade a guardian's sovereignty for decisions of life-

142.
143.

See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5423(a)(2) (2006).
See D.L.H., 2 A.3d at 514-15.

144.

See id. at 514.

145. See id. at 514; 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5462(c) (2006).
146. See D.L.H., 2 A.3d at 514; 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 552 1(d) (2006); id. § 5521(0.
147. See D.L.H., 2 A.3d at 514; 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5521(f).
148. See D.L.H., 2 A.3d at 515; 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5460(a) (2006).
149. See D.L.H., 2 A.3d at 515.
150. See id.; 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5462(c) (2006); see also id. § 5521(f) (stating that
"[tihe court may not grant to a guardian powers controlled by other statute").
151. See id. § 5423(a).
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preserving treatment because guardianships, by their very nature,
concern individuals who are adjudicated to be incompetent. 152
Moreover, any limitation on the court's authority to grant a guardian
such powers does not mean a guardian lacks the ability to influence such
decisions. The Act recognizes that the authority of a health care agent is
not limitless, and guardians pose as one statutory check on health care
agents.15 3 While the Court chose to view this as an extra layer of
protection for incompetent individuals, 154 guardians are explicitly
referenced in the section of the Act discussing the extent of a health care
agent's authority.155 The relevant passage states:
Except as expressly provided otherwise in a health care power of
attorney and subject to subsection (b) and section 5460 (relatingto
relation of health care agent to court-appointedguardian and other

agents), a health care agent shall have the authority to make any
health care decision and to exercise any right and power regarding
the principal's care, custody and health care treatment that the
principal could have made and exercised.156
Furthermore, Section 5460 states that if a court-appointed guardian
is involved, then the "the health care agent is accountable to the guardian
as well as to the principal" and "[t]he guardian shall have the same
power to revoke or amend the appointment of a health care agent that the
principal would have if the principal were not incapacitated but may not
revoke or amend other instructions in an advance health directive absent
judicial authorization." 5 7
The Court's focus on the guardian's ability to amend or revoke the
appointment of a health care agent but not appoint that agent
misconstrues the inherent authority that the Act vests in guardians. 58
The accountability of a health care agent to a guardian suggests that the
guardian is in the superior position of authority.15 9 For instance, a health
care agent, when considering all the requisites for making a health care
decision, could attempt to refuse life-preserving treatment.160 However,
the guardian, in asserting the best interests of the incapacitated person,' 6'
could become concerned by the health care agent's decision and attempt

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See id. § 5511; see also supra Part II.A.
See 20 PA. CONs. STAT. § 5456(a) (2006).
See In re D.L.H., 2 A.3d 505, 515 (Pa. 2010).
See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5456(a).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. § 5460(a).
See D.L.H., 2 A.3d at 515.
See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5460(a).
See id. § 5456(c); id. § 5462(c).
See id. § 5521(a).
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to revoke the agent's fiduciary relationship with the incapacitated
person.162 If the health care agent contested the attempted removal and
argued it was initiated in bad faith, then the court would have to make a
decision regarding life-preserving treatment in order to resolve the
contest.
In a suit such as this, the guardians undoubtedly would assert that
life-preserving treatment was in the incapacitated person's best interest
and removal of the agent was sought because of the agent's decision.
Conversely, the health care agent would point to evidence that indicates
the principal would have refused such treatment. By the very nature of
the dispute, the court, even though not established as a party capable of
making such decisions under Section 5462(c) of the Act, would
ultimately determine whether life-preserving treatment is provided
through its determination of whether the agent's decision stands.
This example illustrates that guardians are not powerless in
decisions involving life-preserving treatment and can assert a point-ofview on life-preserving treatment when there is a health care agent
involved. Moreover, the example suggests that guardians have just as
much authority, if not more, in influencing decisions regarding lifepreserving treatment.
C.

VariationsofDavid's CircumstancesProduce Unanswered
Questions

Regardless of whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court properly
applied the Health Care Agents and Representatives Act to David's
circumstances, the legal implications from the Court's holding remain,
and the holding must be scrupulously examined.
In David's case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to grant
the parents' petition because the Act foreclosed a judicial remedy. The
Court recognized that David may "face additional medical interventions
which ... [are] painful and intrusive," yet, without "arguments grounded
in the Constitution, the courts are bound to enforce the statutory
qualifications on David's right to control his treatment as exercised by
Thus, the Court acknowledged that the Act
his guardians."l 6 3

162. See id § 5460(a).
For discussion purposes in this Comment, the
163. D.L.H., 2 A.3d at 515.
constitutionality of the Health Care Agents and Representatives Act will not be
questioned because of the Supreme Court's holding in Cruzan that "a State may properly
decline to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular individual may
enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be
weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual." Cruzan v. Dir.,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990).
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contemplates all circumstances for a court to consider when lifepreserving treatment is at issue.
However, the Court's reasoning becomes less persuasive when
factual variations of David's case are discussed. For instance, if David
was a previously competent adult who later became incompetent and
developed an end-stage medical condition, the Act no longer imposes an
affirmative duty to provide treatment.1 6 But who is able to make that
decision regarding the continuation or refusal of life-preserving
treatment?
The Health Care Agents and Representatives Act states that the
affirmative duty to provide treatment does not apply to an individual
with an end-stage medical condition.165 Accordingly, the end-stage
medical condition provides an exception to the affirmative duty to
provide life-preserving treatment that incorporates the second-half of
Section 5462(c)(1):
In every other case, subject to any limitation specified in the health
care power of attorney, an attending physician or health care provider
shall comply with a health care decision made by a health care agent
or health care representative to the same extent as if the decision had
been made by the principal.166
The statutory progression in Section 5462(c)(1) represents a policy
judgment made by the Pennsylvania legislature about life-preserving
treatment as it relates to quality of life.167 Absent objections by the
patient or patient's health care agent, Section 5462 mandates that lifepreserving treatment be provided in all situations unless the individual is
in an end-stage medical condition or is permanently unconscious. 168 In
such situations, the Pennsylvania General Assembly recognized that
preserving life is less of a priority either because the quality of life offers
no hope of improvement-a permanent vegetative state-or the
treatment would prolong a more enduring prognosis-an end-stage
medical condition.'6 9
Even if David was once competent and is currently in an end-stage
medical condition, he is still without someone to make decisions on his
t64. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5462(c)(1) (2006) (stating "[h]ealth care necessary to
preserve life shall be provided to an individual who has neither an end-stage medical
condition nor is permanently unconscious, except if the individual is competent and
objects to such care or a health care agent objects on behalf of the principal if authorized
to do so by the health care power of attorney or living will").
165. See id. § 5462(c)(1).
166. Id
167. See D.L.H., 2 A.3d at 514.
168. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5462(c)(1).
169. See id.
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behalf. David's guardian inhibits a health care representative from being
appointed.170 Additionally, no health care agent exists because David
failed to execute an advance health care directive.' 7 1 The absence of a
health care agent or representative leaves David without a statutorily
recognized party who is capable of making decisions regarding lifepreserving treatment "in every other case" under Section 5462(c)(1).17 2
Thus, a plain language interpretation of the Act, as utilized by the Court
in the D.L.H. case, demonstrates that the statute is incapable of allowing
anyone to refuse treatment on David's behalf.
Furthermore, the problems with the Act become more apparent
when the facts are changed to reflect a previous case decided by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Assume that David is a competent
individual who is involved in an accident and becomes permanently
unconscious. As a result, David's guardian requests that his feeding tube
be removed. Such facts closely resemble the case of In re Fiori; a case
that is difficult to reconcile with the In re D.L.H decision. 73
Much like In re D.L.H., the Fiori court rendered a decision on a
technically moot appeal because of the important public policy at
stake.17 4 However, the Fiori court did not extend itself beyond those
circumstances, and instead issued a narrow holding.' 75 The Court held
that where a once-competent adult becomes permanently unconscious
and provides no advance instructions regarding life-sustaining treatment,
a close family member may substitute his or her judgment to render a
decision on the individual's behalf.17 6 In reaching its decision, the Fiori
court recognized the well-established and sacred common law right to
refuse medical treatment.17 7 The Court held that the right to refuse
medical treatment is not terminated when an individual becomes
incompetent; however, this individual right is not absolute, as it must be
After
balanced against the state's interest in preserving life.'
determining that the state's interest in preserving life was outweighed by
Fiori's right of self-determination, the Court concluded that the
individual's right was best manifested through the substituted judgment
170. See id. § 546 1(a)(3); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
171. See 20 PA. CONs. STAT. § 5455(a) (2006).
172. Id. § 5462(c)(1).
173. See In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996).
174. See id. at 909 (stating that "[w]ith the death of Fiori, this appeal is technically
moot. Nonetheless, because this case raises an issue of important public interest, an issue
which is capable of repetition yet is apt to elude review, we have decided to hear this
appeal").
175. See id at 912-13.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 909.
178. See id at 910 (listing the four state interests recognized by courts as protection
of third-parties, prevention of suicide, protection of medical ethics, and preserving life).
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of a close family member because, at the time, there was no statute
addressing medical treatment for a once-competent adult without an
advance directive.' 7 9
Fioripredated the Health Care Agents and Representatives Act, and
a different holding would likely emerge from the Court if the case was
decided following the Act's ratification. The Act makes clear that the
Fiori holding is not disturbed; yet, it is conceptually difficult to see how
Fiori's holding remains good law.'o If David had been like Fioripermanently unconscious after previously being competent-the Health
Care Agents and Representatives Act would still preclude David's
mother-a guardian-from refusing ventilator treatment. The permanent
unconsciousness provides an exception to the hospital's affirmative
duty.1 8' However, the Act stipulates that "in every other case," where
there is no affirmative duty related to treatment necessary to preserve
life, only a health care agent or representative may decide treatment. 18 2
Given the guardian involved, a health care representative could not be
appointed, and the health care agent was not selected in advance of
incompetency.'8 3 Therefore, a Fiori-like David would also be left
without a statutorily recognized party to refuse life-preserving treatment
on his behalf.
Ironically, the Act states that it does not intend to "affect or
supersede the holdings of In re Fiori."84 However, the D.L.H. holding
directly impacts a Fiori scenario. In a footnote, the D.L.H. court noted
the distinction between life-preserving treatment and life-sustaining
treatment.' 85 Life-sustaining treatment only serves "to prolong the
process of dying or maintain the individual in a state of permanent
unconsciousness." 86 In contrast, life-preserving treatment or "[h]ealth
care necessary to preserve life" is not statutorily defined. 87
While lacking statutory clarity, the definition of life-preserving
treatment is significant because such treatment corresponds to an
affirmative duty of dispensation unless certain exceptions apply.18 8
Surrogate decision makers become more involved with all other
179. See id. at 910-11.
180. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5423(a)(1) (2006). Fiori may remain good law if the
distinction between life-preserving treatment and life-sustaining treatment is strictly
adhered to by the Court.
181. See id. § 5462(c)(1).
182.

Id.

183.

See id. § 5461(a)(3).

184.

Id. § 5423(a)(1).

185. See In re D.L.H., 2 A.3d 505, 515 (Pa. 2010) (stating that a "life-sustaining
treatment" situation has never been before the courts in this case").
186. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5422 (2006).
187. Id. § 5462(c)(1).
188.

See id.
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Thus,
treatment decisions, including life-sustaining treatment.189
type
of
treatment
being
be
sure
to
identify
the
providers must
administered and consult with the appropriate parties before proceeding
with treatment.
D.

Statement OfPolicy By Department ofPublic Welfare

The Department of Public Welfare (Department) issued a statement
of policy that became effective January 15, 2011.190 Recognizing that
surrogate health care decision making remained uncertain, the
Department attempted to reconcile the D.L.H. case and the Health Care
Agents and Representatives Act with other existing areas of the law.191
Initially, the Department recognized that the Act disposed of many
issues relating to surrogate health care decision making but did not
supersede all applicable statutes. 192 Consequently, the Department
established a decision making hierarchy for several medical
conditions. 193
The Department discussed incompetent individuals who neither
have an end-stage medical condition nor are permanently unconscious.194
The Department provided that, in the absence of a health care agent, the
guardian of the individual's person makes the decisions.1 95 If no
guardian of the person is appointed, the decision then falls to the health
care representative and then to the facility director as the decider of last
resort.196 However, in a separate section of the statement, the D.L.H.
decision is referenced as providing a limitation on the authority of
surrogate decision makers.1 97 The Department notes that of the abovereferenced surrogates, only a health care agent is capable of making lifepreserving treatment decisions for an individual who is neither in an endstage medical condition nor permanently unconscious.' 9 8
189. See id
190. See Proceduresfor Surrogate Health Care Decision Making, DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WELFARE (Jan. 15, 2011), http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol41/413/78.html.
191. See id
192. See id. (stating that the unaffected "statutes include the following: 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 2713 (relating to neglect of care-dependent persons); 20 Pa.C.S. Chapter 55 (relating to
incapacitated persons); the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE)
Act (MCARE Act) (40 P. S. §§ 1303.101-1303.910); and section 417(c) of the Mental
Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (MH/MR Act) (50 P. S. § 4417(c)),
regarding powers and duties of directors").
193. See id.
194. See id
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
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As with all statements of policy, the Department's statement is an
announcement regarding "the agency's tentative intentions for the
future" and does not "establish[] a standard of conduct which has the
force of law." 99 If the agency applies the statement of policy, the
agency must defend its decision as if the policy statement did not exist.2oo
Furthermore, a reviewing court is free to reject the agency's statement of
policy if the statement reflects an inaccurate interpretation. 2 0 1
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, invoking a similar plain language
interpretation of the Act, would likely view the Department's policy
statement as inaccurate. The Court's reading of Section 5462(c)(1)'s
first sentence dismissed any suggestion that guardians or health care
representatives could be involved in a life-preserving treatment decision
for an individual not in an end-stage medical condition or permanently
unconscious. 2 02 The Court arrived at this conclusion after failing to be
persuaded that other sections of the Act modified application of this
sentence. 203
Following the sentence scrutinized in D.L.H., Section 5462(c)(1)
continues on to state that "[i]n every other case . . . an attending

physician or health care provider shall comply with a health care
decision made by a health care agent or health care representative to the
same extent as if the decision had been made by the principal."204
Guardians are noticeably absent from the list of surrogates delegated
authority.205 Rather, only health care agents and representatives may
assert health care decision on behalf of the incompetent individual.20 6
The above-suggested reading of Section 5462(c)(1), which excludes
guardians, directly contradicts the Department's statement of policy.
However, such a reading is a natural continuation of the Court's D.L.H.
holding.2 07 Moreover, the reading contemplates "every other case"
where life-preserving treatment to a principal who is neither in an endstage medical condition, permanently unconscious, competent and
objects, or has previously appointed a health care agent who objects and
is authorized to do so by a power of attorney or living will. 2 0 8 Therefore,

199. Pa. Human Relations Comn'n v. Norristown Area Sch. Dist., 374 A.2d 671, 679
(Pa. 1977) (citations omitted).
200. See id.
201. See Central Dauphin Sch. Dist. v. Commonwealth, 608 A.2d 576, 581 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992).
202. See In re D.L.H., 2 A.3d 505, 514-15 (Pa. 2010).
203. See id
204. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5462(c)(1) (2006).
205. See id
206. See id.
207. See D.L.H., 2 A.3d at 515.
208.

See 20 PA. CONS. STAT.

§ 5462(c)(1).
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while creative, the Department's creation of a surrogate hierarchy will
likely be unpersuasive to a reviewing court.
E.

Statutory Remedies

Considering all of the scenarios discussed above, in conjunction
with David's own case, two legislative changes to the Health Care
Agents and Representatives Act are necessary.
First, Section 5462(c)(1) should expressly exempt individuals who
have been incompetent their entire lives. The legislative intent section of
the Act implies this exemption, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
reluctant to make it law. 2 09 Therefore, the General Assembly should
expressly exempt lifelong incompetent individuals from the purview of
the Act and allow guardianship proceedings to handle life-preserving
treatment decisions. The Pennsylvania Superior Court outlined a
workable model for considering such circumstances. 2 10 The clear and
convincing evidentiary burden for refusing life-preserving treatment
would be difficult, if not impossible, for a moving party to satisfy; yet,
the process respects an incompetent individual's right to refuse medical
treatment because this right is incorporated through the best interests
standard.2 1 1
Second, in lieu of the above statutory addition, the prohibition
against appointment of a health care representative when there is already
an appointed guardian must be removed from Section 5461.212 The
guardian restriction contemplates that a close family member will not be
needed to make a health care decision-by use of a health care
representative-where there is a guardian involved.213 In re D.L.H.
makes clear that guardians and health care representatives will never be
involved in life-preserving treatment decisions. 214 However, Section
5462(c) states that "in every other case" a health care agent or health care
representative will decide. 2 15 As demonstrated by the previous factual
scenarios, the existence of a guardian should not inhibit an individual's
right to determine treatment decisions through a health care
representative or otherwise.216 The current guardian restriction causes
209. See D.L.H., 2 A.3d 505.
210. See supra Part II.C.2.
211. See supra Part II.C.2.
212.

See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5461(a)(3) (2006).

See id. § 5461(d).
See In re D.L.H., 2 A.3d 505, 514 (Pa. 2010) (stating that the Act "does not
explicitly authorize either surrogate to object to life-preserving care under Section
5462(c)(1)").
215. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5462(c)(1) (2006).
216. See supra Part III.C.
213.

214.
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damage to the overall scheme of the Act by forbidding a third-party from
Therefore, the restriction should be
making treatment decisions.
removed.

IV. CONCLUSION
Upon first impression, the In re D.L.H. decision presents an
interpretation of a narrow area of the law: a specific statute applied to
unique circumstances. The D.L.H. case pertained to an individual who
was incompetent his entire life and never possessed the capacity to
execute an advance health care directive. For such facts, the Court made
clear that the Health Care Agents and Representatives Act precluded a
judicial remedy from being fashioned.2 17
In isolation, the D.L.H. holding appears to be innocuous. However,
as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's logic is extrapolated onto other
facts, the results become less reconcilable with prior jurisprudence and
other legal institutions, such as guardianships.
As suggested, the General Assembly never intended for the Act to
control David's health care outcome. Instead, the Act was enacted to
manage advance health care directives and establish a default, statutory
directive for competent adults who failed to plan in advance of
incompetency. This intention was clearly expressed within the Act and
espoused by its legislative sponsor in the Senate.218 Consequently, an
interpretation of the Act using Pennsylvania's statutory interpretation
guidelines produces a result that properly effectuates the expressed intent
of the General Assembly.
Despite the flawed reasoning, the Court's interpretation remains
good law that controls health care decision making. While the Act was
intended to clarify surrogate health care decision making, the legal
landscape remains murky in wake of the D.L.H. decision.219 The
Department of Public Welfare has already recognized the potential
confusion as evidenced by their need for public comment. 2 20 Therefore,
the General Assembly should resolve the existing uncertainty by
amending the Act.
The General Assembly should exempt individuals who were never
capable of executing an advance health care directive and incorporate
guardians as the surrogate tasked with handling health care decisions.
217. See supra Part II.C.3.
218. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5423(a) (2006); see also supra notes 43-44 and
accompanying text.
219. See State Senator Stewart J. Greenleaf, GreenleafHealth Care Decision Making
Bill Passes House (Nov. 21, 2006), http://www.senatorgreenleaf.com/press/2006/
112106.htm.
220. See supra Part III.D.
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Undoubtedly, the Court's decision in D.L.H. was the morally correct
determination as it emphasized the preservation of life. However, the
decision ignored a life-long incompetent's right to refuse treatment: a
right that is recognized under the Act and at common law. 22 1
Furthermore, there are judicial mechanisms to foster the preservation of
life that still afford respect to a life-long incompetent's rights. As
suggested by the Superior Court, a life-long incompetent would never
have the opportunity to express health care preferences.222 However, the
guardian could still seek to refuse treatment by providing clear and
convincing evidence that it is in the incapacitated person's best
223
Such a model accommodates the rights of those who are
interests.
unable to articulate health-care preferences.
If a less ambitious reform is desired, the General Assembly should,
at the very least, remove the restriction that inhibits appointment of both
a guardian and health care representative. Hypothetical variations on
David's circumstances pose questions as to who is able to decide routine
health care matters for an incompetent who is permanently unconscious
or at an end-stage medical condition. Moreover, the results suggested by
such variations are inconsistent with prior jurisprudence from the Court.
As a result, removing the guardian-health care representative restriction
and prioritizing these two surrogate decision makers would add
substantial clarity to the Act.
Health care decisions involving the most extreme outcomes are not
only difficult for the individual affected but also for his or her family and
friends. The decisions become even more difficult when a surrogate is
making them on behalf of the principal. Because of the nature of these
decisions, the General Assembly must ensure this area of the law is free
from unnecessary frustrations.

221.
222.
223.

See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
See In re D.L.H., 967 A.2d 971 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
See id. at 987.

